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Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis has highlighted the relevance of …nancial intermediaries' risktaking behavior. Various channels have been advanced as possible causes of the build-up of risks in the …nancial sector leading to the crisis, and also multiple policies have been put forward by academics and policy makers to reduce the likelihood and impact of future crises. This paper adds to this literature by reexamining from a theoretical perspective the role of monetary policy and macroprudential policy in addressing the build-up of risks in the …nancial system. To do this, we construct a stylized general equilibrium model in which the key friction comes from the existence of a moral hazard problem in …rms'…nancing by banks.
Our main building block is the setup of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017) , in which competitive …nancial institutions that are funded with uninsured debt can monitor entrepreneurial …rms at a cost. Monitoring is costly and unobservable, so there is a moral hazard problem. This setup provides a characterization of the …nancial industry in which direct market …nance and bank …nance endogenously arise for di¤erent types of …rms. 1 We make three main changes in our previous setup: we introduce the possibility of costly equity …nancing for banks, we reduce the possible types of entrepreneurs to two, safe and risky, and we analyze the e¤ects on the equilibrium of the model of monetary and macroprudential policies. Allowing for equity …nancing in a model with unobservable monitoring is relevant since (inside) equity capital will ameliorate the moral hazard problem, so banks will be able to reduce the cost of debt …nance and o¤er lower rates to their borrowers. 2 The model features four types of agents: entrepreneurs, investors, bankers, and consumers. There is large set of potential entrepreneurs that can be either safe or risky. They require external funding for their investment projects, which is provided by investors and banks. Banks are monitoring institutions set up by bankers to fund risky entrepreneurs.
Investors are characterized by their aggregate initial wealth that is used to fund safe entrepreneurs and provide banks' debt. Bankers are characterized by their aggregate initial wealth that is used to provide banks'equity capital (and possibly also fund safe entrepreneurs). Finally, consumers are characterized by a downward-sloping demand for the output of safe and risky entrepreneurs. We assume that investors and bankers are risk-neutral, and that all agents are price-takers.
The equilibrium is characterized by a rate at which safe entrepreneurs borrow from investors (the safe rate), which de…nes the return that investors get from their wealth, a rate at which risky entrepreneurs borrow from banks, and a return that bankers get from their wealth. It is also characterized by the capital per unit of loans that banks choose to have, the rate at which they borrow from investors, and the monitoring intensity of the projects that they fund. Finally, the rates at which safe and risky entrepreneurs borrow from investors and banks, respectively, determine their investment and output, via the consumers'inverse demand functions.
There are two possible types of equilibria. In the …rst one bank capital is scarce, in the sense that bankers get a higher return from their wealth than investors. In the second one bank capital is abundant, and bankers get the same return from their wealth as investors.
In a capital scarce equilibrium all bankers' wealth is invested in bank capital, while in a capital abundant equilibrium part of it is also used to fund safe entrepreneurs. We focus our analysis on the capital scarce equilibrium.
We show that in equilibrium banks will choose a positive amount of capital and a positive level of monitoring. Moreover, their monitoring intensity will be increasing in their intermediation margin. Since …nancial stability is determined by the monitoring of risky entrepreneurs by banks, this result implies that whatever happens to banks'intermediation margin is key to determine its e¤ects on …nancial stability.
After characterizing the equilibrium of the model, we show that an (exogenous) increase in investors'wealth results in higher investment of safe and risky entrepreneurs, lower returns of debt and equity, lower intermediation margins, and higher leverage and risk-taking by banks.
We also show that an (exogenous) increase in bankers'wealth results in higher investment of safe and risky entrepreneurs, lower returns of debt and equity, higher intermediation margins, and lower leverage and risk-taking by banks. Hence, we conclude that not only the aggregate amount of funding but also the relative amounts of investors and bankers' wealth are key determinants of …nancial stability, as they generate opposite e¤ects on banks' risk-taking incentives.
We next analyze the e¤ect of monetary and macroprudential policies. The latter is modeled by introducing a macroprudential regulator that can set a minimum capital requirement for banks, that is a regulation that requires banks to have a minimum amount of equity capital per unit of loans. The former is modeled by introducing a central bank that can raise the safe interest rate via open market sales of government debt that reduce the funds that investors allocate to safe entrepreneurs and banks.
We show that tighter monetary policy increases the return of debt and equity, reduces investment for both safe and risky entrepreneurs, increases the intermediation margin and reduces risk-taking by banks. We also show that higher capital requirements (if binding) increase the return of equity, decrease the return of debt, shift investment from risky to safe …rms, increase the intermediation margin and reduce risk-taking by banks. Although the e¤ect of both policies on risk-taking goes in the same direction, higher capital requirements have a positive e¤ect that is not present with tight monetary policy, namely they shift investment toward safe …rms, reducing the safe rate and consequently the cost of bank debt, which leads to a further increase in the intermediation margin. For this reason, we conclude that macroprudential policy appears to be more e¤ective than monetary policy for reducing risk-taking by banks.
Moreover, we consider how these two policies interact, showing that, in contrast with our previous result, in the presence of binding capital requirements a tightening of monetary policy increases risk-taking by banks. The reason for this somewhat surprising result is as follows. With binding capital requirements, investment of risky entrepreneurs, and hence the rate at which they borrow from banks, is determined by the capital requirement. Under these conditions, the higher cost of bank debt due to the tightening of monetary policy is not translated into higher loan rates, so the intermediation margin goes down, increasing banks'risk-taking.
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Although both policies can be e¤ective in ameliorating banks'risk-taking incentives, this may be costly in terms of social welfare. Hence, to complete the discussion we undertake a welfare analysis, which requires to derive the objective function of the social planner.
Social welfare comprises the return of investors'wealth, the return of bankers'wealth, the consumers'surplus from entrepreneurial output, and the pro…ts or losses of the central bank from open market operations, in the case of active monetary policy, which are assumed to be transferred to or from investors in a lump sum manner.
Armed with this social welfare function we …rst show that the laissez-faire equilibrium of the model is constrained ine¢ cient, that is, a social planner subject to the same moral hazard problem as the banks could improve upon the equilibrium allocation. The reason is that competition among banks leads to intermediation margins and monitoring intensities that are too low. By moving investment from risky to safe …rms, the social planner widens intermediation margins and increases bank monitoring, which leads to higher social welfare.
Finally, we analyze the optimal stand-alone monetary policy, the optimal stand-alone macropudential policy, and the optimal combination of the two policies. Our numerical results show that the optimal combination of both policies is closer in terms of both …nancial stability and social welfare to the optimal stand-alone macropudential policy, which are in turn higher than those that can be obtained with the optimal stand-alone monetary policy.
The increase in welfare delivered by the combination of both policies is achieved by a further increase of capital requirements which is accompanied by a tightening of monetary policy, which dampens the fall in the safe rate. This paper is related to a large literature that analyzes the so-called "risk-taking channel" of monetary policy, that is the connection between monetary policy rates and …nancial stability. In particular, a set of recent empirical papers has shown that low interest rates, especially for an extended period of time, are signi…cant factors in the build-up of risks in 3 It should be noted that our results should be quali…ed whenever, as noted by Hanson et al. (2011) , a tightening of macroprudential tools may shift some intermediation away from regulated banks and into the shadow banking system, reducing the e¤ectiveness of such tools. 4 the banking system. For example, Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) …nd that low short-term interest rates soften standards for household and corporate loans, Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2014) document that "too low for too long"short-term interest rates lead to increases in risk-taking by banks, Jiménez et al. (2014) show that lower short-term rates induce lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex-ante riskier …rms, while Dell'Ariccia, Laeven and Suarez (2017) show that short-term interest rates are negatively associated to ex-ante risk-taking by banks, via changes in leverage. Our paper provides a theoretical framework that can account for these empirical results.
The paper is also related to the literature on the connection between …nancial frictions and macroeconomic ‡uctuations, starting with Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) , and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . This literature has mainly focused on agency problems between …rms and their …nanciers, in which …rms'net worth plays a key role. In this setup lower rates increase borrowers'net worth, leading to credit expansions.
More recently, this approach has been extended to incorporate similar agency problems between banks and their …nanciers, in which the focus is on banks' net worth; see, for example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) , He and Krishnamurthy (2013) , Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) , and the survey by Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2013) . While these papers shed light on the mechanisms by which shocks can be ampli…ed, their focus is not on banks'risk-taking decisions, and the way in which they might depend on monetary and macroprudential policies, which is the focus of our work.
Finally, our paper is closely related to the theoretical literature that has analyzed the determinants of banks'risk-taking incentives and the way in which they are a¤ected by competition and regulation; see Holmström and Tirole (1997) , Allen and Gale (2000) , Hellmann, Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000) , and Repullo (2004) . Unlike these models, which are essentially partial equilibrium, following Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017) our approach is to embed the key incentive mechanism into a stylized general equilibrium model. The paper closest to ours is Dell'Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez (2014) ; see also Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2013) .
In their model there is an in…nitely elastic supply of investors'wealth at a given safe rate, determined by monetary policy, and in…nitely elastic supply of bankers'wealth at a given spread over the safe rate. In contrast, we posit …xed aggregate supplies of investors' and bankers'wealth. Among other things, our setup allows for monetary and macroprudential policies to a¤ect the cost of bank equity capital, which is exogenously …xed in their model.
With regard to the policy implications of our paper, it is useful to recall the main contrasting views described in the survey paper by Smets (2014) ; see also Adrian and Liang (2018) . The …rst view, which he calls the modi…ed Jackson Hole consensus, argues that "the monetary authority should keep its relatively narrow mandate of price stability and stabilizing resource utilization around a sustainable level, whereas macroprudential authorities should pursue …nancial stability, with each having their own instruments." In Bernanke's (2011) words, "monetary policy is too blunt a tool to be routinely used to address possible …nancial imbalances; instead, monetary policy should remain focused on macroeconomic objectives, while more-targeted microprudential and macroprudential tools should be used to address developing risks to …nancial stability."
The second view is the leaning against the wind policy, according to which "…nancial stability concerns should be part of the secondary objectives in the monetary policy strategy."This view is best described by Stein (2013) : "Supervisory and regulatory tools remain imperfect in their ability to promptly address many sorts of …nancial stability concerns. If the underlying economic environment creates a strong incentive for …nancial institutions to, say, take on more credit risk in a reach for yield, it is unlikely that regulatory tools can completely contain this behavior." He concludes that "monetary policy ... has one important advantage relative to supervision and regulation-namely that it gets in all of the cracks."
Our results provide support for the view that macroprudential policy should be the primary tool for addressing risks to …nancial stability. It is true that tight monetary policy "gets in all of the cracks,"raising all interest rates and reducing investment across all types of …rms, but it also implies raising banks'cost of borrowing, which increases their risk-taking incentives. Thus, from the perspective of our model, getting in all of the cracks can in fact be counterproductive.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, characterizes the laissez-faire equilibrium, and shows some useful comparative statics results. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects on the equilibrium of the model of two possible instruments to control banks' risk-taking, namely monetary and macroprudential policies. Section 4 derives the objective function of the social planner and presents the welfare analysis of the two policies.
Section 5 contains our concluding remarks.
Model
Consider an economy with two dates (t = 0; 1) and three types of risk-neutral agents: entrepreneurs, investors, and bankers.
There is a continuum of two observable types of potential entrepreneurs, safe (type 0) and risky (type 1). Entrepreneurs are penniless and have investment projects that require external …nance. The projects of safe entrepreneurs can be funded by investors and bankers, while those of risky entrepreneurs are only funded by monitoring institutions set up by bankers to fund risky projects, called banks.
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Safe entrepreneurs have projects that require a unit investment at t = 0 and yield a deterministic return A 0 at t = 1: Risky entrepreneurs have projects that require a unit investment at t = 0 and yield a stochastic return e A 1 at t = 1 given by
0;
with probability 1 p + m; with probability p m;
where p is a parameter in (0; 1) and m 2 [0; p] is the monitoring intensity of the lending bank.
The return A 0 of the projects of the safe entrepreneurs is a positive and decreasing function of the aggregate investment x 0 of the safe entrepreneurs. Similarly, the success return A 1 of the projects of the risky entrepreneurs is a positive and decreasing function of the aggregate investment x 1 of the risky entrepreneurs. Moreover, to simplify the presentation we assume that the same function describes the return of the projects of both types of entrepreneurs, so A 0 = A(x 0 ) and
We also assume that the outcome of the projects of the risky entrepreneurs is driven by a single aggregate risk factor z that is uniformly distributed in [0; 1]. A project monitored with intensity m will fail if and only if z < p m: This assumption implies that the return of projects monitored with the same intensity will be perfectly correlated.
There is a continuum of investors characterized by their aggregate initial wealth W > 0:
Investors are only interested in consumption at t = 1; so they supply their wealth inelastically to fund safe entrepreneurs and banks.
There is a continuum of bankers characterized by their aggregate initial wealth K > 0:
Bankers are only interested in consumption at t = 1; so they supply their wealth inelastically to fund safe entrepreneurs and/or set up banks to fund risky entrepreneurs. Bankers choose the capital structure of the banks they set up, described by the capital per unit of loans k;
and the interest rate B at which they borrow from investors. They also choose the monitoring intensity m of each of the risky projects they fund, which entails a non-pecuniary monitoring
where > 0: A key informational friction is that bank monitoring is not observed by investors, so there is a moral hazard problem.
We assume free entry of entrepreneurs, which implies that they will only be able to borrow at an interest rate that leaves them no surplus. Hence, if the rate at which safe entrepreneurs borrow from investors is R 0 ; then a measure x 0 of these entrepreneurs will enter the market until A(x 0 ) = R 0 : Also, if the rate at which risky entrepreneurs borrow from banks is R 1 ; then a measure x 1 of these entrepreneurs will enter the market until A(x 1 ) = R 1 : Thus,
A(x 0 ) and A(x 1 ) are the inverse loan demand functions of safe and risky entrepreneurs.
The initial wealth W of investors is used to either directly fund safe entrepreneurs at the rate R 0; or indirectly (via banks) fund risky entrepreneurs, where by arbitrage they will get an expected return equal to R 0 :
The initial wealth K of bankers is used to either directly fund safe entrepreneurs at the rate R 0; or to set up banks, where they get an expected return R k : If R k > R 0 they will invest 8 all their wealth in banks, while if R k = R 0 they will also fund safe entrepreneurs (which in equilibrium ensures that R k never falls below R 0 ):
Finally, we assume that funding markets are perfectly competitive in the sense that investors take the safe rate R 0 as given, and banks take as given the loan rate R 1 as well as the rates R 0 and R k that determine their cost of debt and equity, respectively.
Equilibrium
Consider a representative bank lending to risky entrepreneurs. The bank chooses three variables: the capital per unit of loans k provided by bankers, the interest rate B o¤ered to investors (to raise the remaining 1 k funds per unit of loans), and the monitoring intensity m of its loans, taking as given the loan rate R 1 ; and the returns R 0 and R k required by investors and bankers, respectively.
As shown in the Appendix, perfect competition in the market for risky loans leads to an equilibrium in which the representative bank lends at the minimum feasible rate R 1 : Hence, an equilibrium is de…ned by
subject to the bank's incentive compatibility constraint
the bankers'participation constraint
and the investors'participation constraint
The incentive compatibility constraint (4) characterizes the bank's choice of monitoring m given that it gets R 1 and pays (1 k )B with probability 1 p+m (and with probability p m gets zero, by limited liability). The participation constraints (5) and (6) ensure that bankers and investors get the required return on their investments.
It should be noted that the assumption of a single aggregate risk factor implies that the bank's return per unit of loans is identical to the individual project return. It also implies that the loans'probability of default equals the bank's probability of failure.
A competitive equilibrium is characterized by a triple
(a capital scarce equilibrium) we have
and if R 0 = R k (a capital abundant equilibrium) we have
where R 1 is a solution for R 0 = R 0 and R k = R k to the bank's problem (3) subject to
constraints (4)- (6), k is the capital per unit of loans chosen by the banks in this solution, and x 0 and x 1 satisfy A(x 0 ) = R 0 and A(x 1 ) = R 1 :
According to this de…nition, there are two possible types of equilibria. In the …rst one bank capital is scarce, in the sense that bankers get a higher return from their wealth than investors (R k > R 0 ): In the second one bank capital is abundant, and bankers get the same return from their wealth as investors (R k = R 0 ): In both equilibria, given the free entry assumption, the aggregate investments of safe and risky entrepreneurs, x 0 and x 1 ; are the ones implied by the loan rates R 0 and R 1 :
In a capital scarce equilibrium, equation (7) states that the funds allocated by investors to funding safe entrepreneurs plus those allocated to funding banks must be equal to their initial wealth W; while equation (8) states that the funds allocated by bankers to funding banks must be equal to their initial wealth K: In contrast, since the funds of investors and bankers get the same return in a capital abundant equilibrium, we only need a single market clearing condition given by equation (9).
In what follows, we focus on a capital scarce equilibrium with m < p; so the projects of the risky entrepreneurs have a positive probability of failure. 5 To characterize the solution 5 A su¢ ciently large value of parameter in the monitoring cost function (2) ensures that m < p:
to the bank's problem (3) subject to constraints (4)- (6), suppose that the equilibrium monitoring intensity m satis…es m > 0: Then, by the convexity of the monitoring cost function c(m); the bank's incentive compatibility constraint (4) reduces to the …rst-order condition
To show that in this case the investors'participation constraint (6) is binding, note that if it were not we could slightly reduce the borrowing rate B and the loan rate R 1 so that (10) would hold for the same m ; in which case the bankers' participation constraint (5) would still be satis…ed, which contradicts the de…nition of equilibrium.
To show that the bankers'participation constraint (5) is also binding, note that if it were not we could slightly increase the bank's capital k and reduce the loan rate R 1 so that (10) would hold for the same m ; in which case the investors'participation constraint (6) would still be satis…ed, which contradicts the de…nition of equilibrium.
Solving for B in the investors' participation constraint (6) (written as an equality), substituting it into the …rst-order condition (10), and rearranging gives
Solving for R 1 (1 k )B in the bankers' participation constraint (5) (written as an equality), substituting it into the …rst-order condition (10), and solving for k gives
By the properties of the monitoring cost function (2) the right-hand-side of (12) These results imply that the equilibrium loan rate R 1 satis…es
subject to (12). The …rst-order condition that characterizes the solution to this problem is
Moreover, one can show that under assumption (2) the second-order condition is satis…ed.
Hence, there will be an equilibrium with m > 0 if and only if
Form here it follows that in a capital scarce equilibrium we must have m > 0: To see this,
note that by the incentive compatibility constraint (4) and assumption (2), m = 0 implies
so the bankers'participation constraint (5) can only be satis…ed for k = 0: But if the bankers are not investing their wealth K > 0 in bank capital, we must have R k = R 0 ; which by (15) implies m > 0; which is a contradiction.
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Summing up, we have characterized a capital scarce equilibrium of the model by the following equations: the bankers'and the investors'participations constraints (5) and (6), which are satis…ed with equality, the relationship between capital and monitoring (12), the …rst-order condition that determines the minimum feasible loan rate for the risky entrepreneurs (14), and the market clearing conditions, (7) and (8). Thus, we have six equations to determine six equilibrium variables: R 0 ; R 1 ; R k ; k ; B ; m : We have also shown that in this equilibrium banks choose a positive level of capital per unit of loans k > 0 and a positive level of monitoring m > 0: Finally, using the …rst-order condition (10) and the monitoring cost function (2), it follows that equilibrium monitoring satis…es
Thus, monitoring m will be proportional to the intermediation margin R 1 (1 k )B :
Comparative statics
We next illustrate the properties of the equilibrium for a particular parameterization of the model that yields a capital scarce equilibrium. In particular, apart from the quadratic monitoring cost function (2), we assume that the inverse loan demand functions A(x 0 ) and
where > 1: 7 We take = 5 in the monitoring cost function (2) and = 2 in the inverse loan demand function (18), and assume that the probability of failure of the projects of risky entrepreneurs in the absence of monitoring is p = 0:2: respectively. An increase in K leads 7 This assumption will be derived in Section 4 from the demand of a representative consumer with a utility function over the goods produced by the two types of entrepreneurs. It can also be derived from the demand of a set of …nal good producers that use entrepreneurs'output as an intermediate input; see Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017) .
8 Parameters values are chosen for the purpose of illustrating the qualitative properties of the equilibrium of the model. They are not calibrated to yield realistic values of the endogenous variables.
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to an increase in the aggregate investment of both types of entrepreneurs. Given that A(x 0 ) = R 0 and A(x 1 ) = R 1 ; this implies that the rates R 0 and R 1 at which they borrow go down. The e¤ect on the safe rate R 0 is shown in Panel B, together with the e¤ect on the return R k of the wealth of bankers, which also goes down. In contrast with the results in Figure 1 , Panel C shows that the increase in bankers'wealth K increases the representative bank's capital per unit of loans k ; so leverage goes down. Finally, Panel D shows that the increase in K also increases the monitoring intensity m of the representative bank, so its probability of failure goes down.
[FIGURE 2]
The previous results illustrate that, when both investors'wealth W and bankers'wealth K vary, what is key to determine the e¤ect on …nancial stability is the direction and the relative magnitude of these changes. Moreover, although increases in both W and K (resulting, for example, from a global savings glut) lead to a fall in interest rates, bank leverage and risktaking go up (as the evidence in Adrian and Shin, 2008, shows) only if the increase in W is more signi…cant than the increase in K:
Policy Analysis
This section analyzes the e¤ects on the equilibrium of the model of two possible instruments to control banks'risk-taking, namely a tightening of monetary policy and the introduction (and tightening) of capital requirements for banks.
Monetary policy
Monetary policy is modeled by introducing a new agent, the central bank, that can engineer a change in the safe interest rate R 0 : A way in which this can be done in our model setup is by assuming that (i) there is a government with an amount of outstanding safe debt, and (ii) the central bank can increase or decrease the amount of government debt held by investors. This means that the initial wealth of investors W is divided between a part invested in funding safe entrepreneurs and banks, and another part invested in government debt.
9 From the perspective of individual investors, the division is immaterial since they get the same return, but it matters from an aggregate perspective because government debt in the hands of investors reduces the funds allocated to private investments, and hence changes the equilibrium of the model.
The equilibrium e¤ects of a tightening of monetary policy that reduces the wealth that investors allocate to funding safe entrepreneurs and banks can be seen in Figure 1 by simply reinterpreting the variable in the horizontal axis as investors' privately invested wealth.
Such tightening reduces aggregate investment of both types of entrepreneurs, increase the rates at which they borrow (in particular, the safe rate R 0 that the central banks targets), increases the return of the wealth of investors and bankers, and reduces bank leverage and risk-taking.
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It should be noted that our modelling of monetary policy is silent for now about the implications for the balance sheet of the central bank, in particular what it will do with the (real) resources obtained by selling government debt. 11 What is key is that these resources are channeled to uses di¤erent from the funding of safe or risky entrepreneurs, so they have no impact on the equilibrium of the model.
Macroprudential policy
Macroprudential policy is modeled by introducing a new agent, the macroprudential regulator, that can set minimum capital requirements for banks, so their capital per unit of loans k cannot be below a lower bound k: We assume that parameter values are such that the capital requirement is binding, and analyze the e¤ect on the equilibrium of the model of tightening the requirement, that is increasing k:
One interesting feature of the model with binding capital requirements is that, in a capital 9 Alternatively, we could simply assume that the central bank sells its own liabilities (reserves remunerated at market rates) to investors. 10 An expansionary monetary policy would lead to the opposite results, very much in line with the e¤ects of a savings glut analyzed in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017) . 11 The welfare analysis of Section 4 introduces a return that the central bank gets from these resources.
scarce equilibrium, they determine the aggregate investment x 1 of the risky entrepreneurs and hence the rate R 1 = A(x 1 ) at which they borrow from banks. To see this, notice that in such equilibrium all bankers'wealth K is invested in banks, so it must be the case that kx 1 = K; which implies x 1 = K=k: Hence, a tightening of the capital requirement k leads to a reduction in bank lending x 1 and an increase in the lending rate R 1 to risky entrepreneurs. Figure 3 shows the e¤ect of a tightening of a binding capital requirement k in a capital scarce equilibrium. Panel A shows that the aggregate investment x 0 of safe entrepreneurs goes up, while the aggregate investment x 1 of risky entrepreneurs goes down. We have already explained the latter e¤ect. The former is simply a consequence that, by the market clearing conditions (7) and (8), we have x 0 + x 1 = W + K; so the fall in x 1 implies an equivalent increase in x 0 : Hence, the rate R 0 at which safe entrepreneurs borrow goes down, while the rate R 1 at which risky entrepreneurs borrow goes up. The e¤ect on the safe rate R 0 is shown in Panel B, together with the e¤ect on the return R k of the wealth of bankers, which also goes up due to the scarcity of bank capital induced by the regulation. Finally, Panels C and D show that the tightening of the capital requirement reduces bank leverage and risk-taking.
[
FIGURE 3]
It should be noted that capital requirements increase …nancial stability through two channels. At the micro level, the increase in k has a direct e¤ect on banks' monitoring incentives, since it increases the intermediation margin R 1 (1 k)B and hence, as implied by (17), bank monitoring m : At the macro level, the increase in k has an indirect e¤ect on banks'monitoring incentives, since it increases the loan rate R 1 and reduces the safe rate R 0 and consequently the banks'borrowing rate B ; which further increases the intermediation margin R 1 (1 k)B and bank monitoring m : Hence, we conclude that, in contrast with our previous result, when capital requirements are binding a tightening of monetary policy increases banks'risk-taking.
[FIGURE 4]
Discussion
We have shown that both a tightening of monetary policy (when capital requirements are not binding) and an increase in capital requirements (when they are) increase banks'monitoring intensity and hence reduce risk-taking. However, the channels whereby they operate are di¤erent. Tightening monetary policy reduces aggregate investment of both safe and risky entrepreneurs, increasing the rates at which they borrow. In contrast, increasing capital requirements shifts investment from risky to safe entrepreneurs. As a result safe entrepreneurs borrow at lower rates, while risky entrepreneurs borrow at higher rates.
These di¤erent e¤ects follow from the fact that when tightening monetary policy the central bank reduces the resources that investors allocate to funding safe entrepreneurs and banks, e¤ectively shrinking the supply of savings to the private sector (a savings dearth).
In contrast, a tightening of capital requirements leads to a redistribution of funds between safe and risky entrepreneurs, without any change in the aggregate supply of savings to the private sector.
The e¤ect on …nancial stability of these two policies can be explained by reference to the relationship (17) between the equilibrium monitoring intensity m and the intermediation margin R 1 (1 k )B : An increase in monitoring m requires that the di¤erence between the loan rate R 1 and the payment promised to debtholders (1 k )B goes up. Both policies increase R 1 and both policies increase k ; voluntarily in the case of the tightening of monetary policy and mandatorily in the case of the tightening of capital requirements, widening the intermediation margin. However, a tightening of monetary policy increases the equilibrium safe rate R 0 ; while an increase in capital requirements reduces it, which translates into opposite e¤ects on the banks'borrowing rate B : Consequently, macroprudential policy appears to be a more e¤ective instrument for containing banks'risk-taking incentives.
The analysis of the two policies combined as opposed to in isolation leads to some inter- However, this statement should be quali…ed whenever, as noted by Hanson et al. (2011) , a tightening of capital requirements may shift some intermediation away from regulated banks and into the shadow banking system, reducing the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential tools.
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In such cases, the analysis in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2018) shows that tightening monetary policy may be useful to prevent the expansion and reduce the risk of shadow banks, since their funding costs are directly related to the level of the safe rate targeted by the central bank.
Welfare
This section analyzes whether the laissez-faire equilibrium of the model is constrained e¢ -cient, that is, whether a social planner subject to the same moral hazard problem as the banks could improve upon the equilibrium allocation. We show that the equilibrium allocation is constrained ine¢ cient: the social planner would shift investments toward safe entrepreneurs, which will widen the intermediation margin and increase monitoring, thereby ameliorating the moral hazard problem. Then, we consider the optimal stand-alone monetary policy, the optimal stand-alone level of the capital requirement, and the optimal combination of the two policies.
Social welfare function
To proceed with the welfare analysis we …rst have to derive the objective function of the social planner, which comprises: (i) the return of investors'wealth, (ii) the return of bankers' wealth, (iii) the consumers'surplus from entrepreneurial output, and (iv) the pro…ts or losses of the central bank from open market operations, in the case of active monetary policy, which are assumed to be transferred to or from investors in a lump sum manner. All these amounts are measured in terms of a composite good available at t = 1:
The return of investors' wealth is simply the product of their initial wealth W by the safe rate R 0 : Similarly, the return of bankers' wealth is the product of their initial wealth K by the return R k ; which according to the participation constraint (5) is de…ned net of 13 In a similar vein, Tarullo (2019) writes: "The current regulatory framework does not deal e¤ectively with threats to …nancial stability outside the perimeter of regulated banking organizations, notably from forms of shadow banking," monitoring costs.
To compute consumers'surplus from entrepreneurial output, we introduce a representative consumer with a utility function over the goods produced by the two types of entrepreneurs and the composite good. We assume that one unit of investment produces a unit of output, if successful. Hence, the output y 0 of the safe entrepreneurs equals their aggregate investment x 0 ; while the output of the risky entrepreneurs y 1 equals their aggregate investment x 1 ; with probability 1 p + m; and zero, otherwise.
14 Following Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017), we introduce the following utility function for the representative consumer
where q is the consumption of the composite good, y 0 and y 1 are the outputs of safe and risky entrepreneurs, and > 1: The budget constraint of the representative consumer is
where A 0 is the price of the output of the safe entrepreneurs (the deterministic return of their investment), A 1 is the price of the output the risky entrepreneurs (the success return of their investment), and I is her (exogenous) income.
Maximizing the utility function (19) subject to the budget constraint (20) gives the …rst-order condition
for i = 0; 1: Substituting this result into the consumer's utility function, and using the fact that y 0 = x 0 with probability 1 and y 1 = x 1 with probability 1 p + m; gives the following measure of consumers'surplus
Importantly, the …rst-order condition (21) provides a rationale for the inverse loan demand function (18) used in our previous numerical analysis.
To compute the pro…ts or losses of the central bank from open market operations, suppose that it tightens monetary policy by selling government debt for an amount equal to a proportion of the initial wealth W of investors. As noted in Section 3.1, the central bank channels these resources to uses di¤erent from funding of entrepreneurs. In particular, we will assume that it invests W at a …xed rate R CB : At the same time, the central bank loses the return of the government debt sold to investors, which yields the safe rate R 0 : Hence, the pro…ts or losses of the central bank from this operation are W (R CB R 0 ): 15 This amount is transferred (if positive) or taxed (if negative) in a lump sum manner to investors at t = 1:
Adding up the four elements of social welfare gives
By the market clearing condition (7), rewritten to take into account that only a fraction 1 of investors'wealth is available for funding safe entrepreneurs and banks, we have
And by the market clearing condition (8), together with the participation constraints (5) and (6) (which in equilibrium are satis…ed with equality), we have
Putting together (24) and (25) yields
Substituting this result into (23), and using the fact that R 0 = A(x 0 ) = (x 0 ) 1= and
we get the following expression of social welfare
The …rst term in (27) is the welfare associated with the output of safe entrepreneurs, the second term is the welfare associated with the output of risky entrepreneurs, the third term subtracts the costs of monitoring risky entrepreneurs, and the last term is the return of the investments of the central bank.
Constrained ine¢ ciency of equilibrium
To show that the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation is constrained ine¢ cient, we set = 0 so the central bank does not operate, and consider the maximization of the social welfare function (27) subject to the …rst-order condition (10) that characterizes the banks'choice of monitoring, the investors'participation constraint (6), and the market clearing conditions (7) and (8). Multiplying the …rst-order condition (10) by (1 p + m)x 1 ; and using the investors' participation constraint (6) (written as an equality) and the market clearing condition (8),
gives
; and x 1 K = W x 0 (implied by the market clearing conditions (7) and (8)) into this expression and rearranging gives
Using this result, the social welfare function (27) simpli…es to
Consider now a marginal reduction in the investment x 1 of risky entrepreneurs (and the corresponding marginal increase in the investment x 0 of safe entrepreneurs). In the laissezfaire allocation the equilibrium loan rate R 1 is obtained by solving (13) subject to (12), so by the …rst-order condition (14) we have dR 1 =dm = 0: Hence, a marginal reduction in x 1 that increases the loan rate R 1 = A(x 1 ) leads to a very large increase in monitoring. But by the properties of the monitoring cost function (2) we have
Hence, the small reduction in x 1 is more than compensated by the large increase in m; so both the …rst and the second terms in the social welfare function (30) go up. In other words, the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation is constrained ine¢ cient.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. Competition among banks leads to intermediation margins and monitoring intensities that are too low. By moving investment from risky to safe entrepreneurs, the social planner widens intermediation margins and increases bank monitoring, which leads to higher social welfare.
Welfare analysis of monetary and macroprudential policies
We now introduce the two policies analyzed in Section 3, and consider the maximization of the social welfare function (27) using these policies. Let us denote by SW ( ; k) the social welfare associated with a monetary policy that mops up a fraction of the initial wealth W of investors, and a macroprudential policy that sets a minimum capital requirement k for The welfare analysis of monetary policy requires to specify the rate R CB at which the central bank invests the real resources obtained by selling government debt. To avoid biasing the result in a positive or a negative direction (by setting an arbitrarily high or low R CB ),
we will assume that R CB equals the initial equilibrium safe rate R 0 : Under this assumption, the e¤ect of a tightening of monetary policy ( > 0) on social welfare is shown in Panel A of improving. However, due to the scarcity of bank capital, a very high capital requirement is not optimal, as it leads to an excessive reduction in the investment of risky entrepreneurs.
Panel B of Figure 6 shows the distributional e¤ects of such policy. Bankers are better o¤, since the equilibrium return of bank capital goes up, but investors are worse o¤, since the equilibrium safe rate goes down. Finally, consumers are (mildly) better o¤ as a result of the shift from risky to safe investments (and the reduction of the risk of the former).
FIGURE 6]
We next compare the e¤ects of monetary and macroprudential policies in two dimensions: …nancial stability, proxied by equilibrium bank monitoring, and social welfare. that macroprudential policy is not only much more e¤ective on the …nancial stability front, since it can lead to a higher level of monitoring, but also dominates monetary policy on the 24 social welfare front. The intuition for this result follows from the analysis of the constrained ine¢ ciency of the laissez-faire equilibrium. The second-best policy is to shift investment from risky to safe …rms, something that is achieved by tightening capital requirements.
18
In contrast, tightening monetary policy reduces the investment of risky and also safe …rms, decreasing consumers'surplus and eventually welfare.
[ FIGURE 7] Finally, the green line in Figure 7 shows the social welfare associated with the optimal combination of monetary and macroprudential policies for a given level of monitoring m;
that is a solution to
where m( ; k) denotes the equilibrium monitoring associated with a monetary policy that mops up a fraction of the initial wealth W of investors, and a macroprudential policy that sets a minimum capital requirement k for banks. By construction, the green line is above the the blue line, corresponding to using only macroprudential policy, and it is also above the red line, corresponding to using only monetary policy. The additional increase in welfare delivered by the combination of both policies is achieved by a further increase of capital requirements that is accompanied by a tightening of monetary policy, which dampens the fall in the safe rate.
As can be seen in Figure 7 , we …nd that the optimal combination of monetary and macroprudential policies is closer in terms of both …nancial stability and social welfare to the optimal stand-alone macropudential policy than to the optimal stand-alone monetary policy. This is consistent with our previous discussion on the comparison of both policies, as the constrained e¢ cient allocation entails a shift of investment from risky to safe entrepreneurs, something that is directly achieved by tightening capital requirements. In fact, by adjusting investments in the two types of …rms, macroprudential policy can implement the constrained e¢ cient allocation for the case where the central bank does not operate (setting = 0 in the social welfare function (27)). This allocation is characterized by a lower safe rate, relative to the laissez-faire allocation, due to the higher investment of safe entrepreneurs. Hence, our assumption that the rate R CB at which the central bank invests the real resources obtained by selling government debt equals the (higher) initial equilibrium safe rate implies that a tightening of monetary policy, which transfers resources to a safe asset with a higher return, is optimal. Moreover, this allows for a further increase in capital requirements, so the optimal combination of both policies entails tightening them relative to the optimal stand-alone macropudential policy.
Concluding Remarks
This We show that both policies are e¤ective in improving banks'monitoring incentives, through an increase in the intermediation margin. However, there are signi…cant di¤erences. Tighter capital requirements shift investment toward safe …rms, decreasing safe rates, whereas tighter monetary policy reduces investment for both safe and risky …rms, increasing safe rates, so the e¤ect on the margin is smaller. Consequently, macroprudential policy appears to be a more e¤ective instrument for reducing risk-taking by banks. Moreover, we also show that in the presence of binding capital requirements a tightening of monetary policy increases risk-taking by banks. This result highlights the importance of analyzing the interaction of both policies.
We complete our discussion by providing a welfare analysis of the model, showing that the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation is constrained ine¢ cient, because competition among banks leads to intermediation margins and monitoring intensities that are too low. Hence, there is a role for government intervention. In particular, we show that tightening monetary and macroprudential policies, on their own, increase welfare. Moreover, we also show that their optimal combination is closer in terms of both …nancial stability and social welfare to the optimal stand-alone macropudential policy than to the optimal stand-alone monetary policy.
In this sense, the results of the paper provide support for the view that macroprudential policy should be the primary tool for addressing risks to …nancial stability.
We would like to conclude with a few remarks. First, we assume that the outcome of the projects of risky entrepreneurs is driven by a single aggregate risk factor, so in equilibrium their returns are perfectly correlated. This assumption greatly simpli…es the analysis, and provides a stark description of the e¤ects of an extreme realization of a systematic risk factor. However, at the cost of greater complexity, it would be possible to analyze a setup in which there is imperfect default correlation, using for example the single risk factor model of Vasicek (2002) , as in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010 Finally, it is important to note that our conclusion in favor of using macroprudential tools as the primary instrument to enhance …nancial stability should be quali…ed in situations in which, as analyzed in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2018) , the presence of a shadow banking system may reduce the e¤ectiveness of these tools.
Appendix
This Appendix shows that perfect competition in the market for risky loans leads to an equilibrium in which the representative bank lends at the minimum feasible rate R 1 de…ned in (3). We …rst characterize the bank's choice of capital per unit of loans k; interest rate B o¤ered to investors, and monitoring intensity m for any R 1 R 1 ; showing that k and B are decreasing and m is increasing in R 1 : We then show that bank pro…ts are increasing in R 1 for R 1 R 1 : But since pro…ts are zero for R 1 = R 1 ; we conclude that the only possible equilibrium loan rate is R 1 :
Consider a representative bank that given the loan rate R 1 and the returns R 0 and R k required by investors and bankers (with R k > R 0 as in a capital scarce equilibrium), sets a capital per unit of loans k: The bank's choice of borrowing rate B and monitoring intensity m is given by the solution of the bank's incentive compatibility constraint (4) and the investors' participation constraint (6) (written as an equality). Solving for B in (6) and substituting it into the …rst-order condition (10) that characterizes the bank's incentive compatibility constraint (4) gives condition (11). The right-hand side of (11) is convex in m ; so in general there will be two solutions for m : Solving for B in (6), substituting it into the bank's objective function, and di¤erentiating with respect to m gives
which is positive by (10). Hence, whenever there are two solutions to (11), the bank will strictly prefer the highest one, simply denoted m :
The bank's choice of capital per unit of loans k is obtained by solving
The …rst-order condition that characterizes the solution to this problem is
Using (11) This …gure shows the combination of monitoring and social welfare that obtains under stand-alone monetary policies (red line) and stand-alone macroprudential policies (blue line). The …gure also shows social welfare under the optimal combination of both policies for a given level of monitoring (green line).
